Struct SessionWorkspace 

pub struct SessionWorkspace {
    pub root: PathBuf,
    pub session_id: String,
    pub is_sandbox: bool,
}

Session workspace configuration

Fields

root: PathBuf

The root directory for this session’s workspace

session_id: String

Session ID this workspace belongs to

is_sandbox: bool

Whether this is a user-provided directory or auto-generated sandbox

Implementations

impl SessionWorkspace

pub fn create_sandbox( session_id: &str, ) -> Result<SessionWorkspace, WorkspaceError>

Create a new session workspace with an auto-generated sandbox directory

Creates a directory at ~/.gestura/sessions/<session_id>/

pub fn from_directory( session_id: &str, directory: PathBuf, ) -> Result<SessionWorkspace, WorkspaceError>

Create a session workspace using an existing directory

This is used when the user specifies a project directory (CLI cwd or GUI selection)

pub fn resolve_path(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, WorkspaceError>

Resolve a path relative to the workspace root with full security validation

This method performs comprehensive security checks:

1. Validates path for dangerous characters/patterns
2. Checks path depth limits
3. Validates symlinks point within workspace
4. Ensures resolved path is within workspace bounds

Returns an error if any security check fails.

pub fn resolve_path_for_read( &self, path: &Path, ) -> Result<PathBuf, WorkspaceError>

Resolve a path for reading (file must exist)

Additional validation for read operations including symlink target checks.

pub fn resolve_path_for_write( &self, path: &Path, ) -> Result<PathBuf, WorkspaceError>

Resolve a path for writing (parent directory must exist)

Validates the parent directory exists and is writable.

pub fn resolve_path_for_create( &self, path: &Path, ) -> Result<PathBuf, WorkspaceError>

Resolve a path for creation (file/dir may not exist yet).

This is similar to Self::resolve_path_for_write, but it does not require the parent directory to exist. It is intended for tools that legitimately create output directories as part of their operation (e.g. screen capture artifacts).

Security note: even when the target doesn’t exist yet, we still validate any existing path components for symlink escapes.

pub fn is_path_allowed(&self, path: &Path) -> bool

Check if a path is within the workspace (without resolving)

pub fn path_has_symlinks(&self, path: &Path) -> bool

Check if a path contains any symlinks

pub fn get_metadata(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<Metadata, WorkspaceError>

Get file metadata with symlink awareness

pub fn get_symlink_metadata( &self, path: &Path, ) -> Result<Metadata, WorkspaceError>

Get symlink metadata (doesn’t follow symlinks)

pub fn root(&self) -> &Path

Get the workspace root directory

pub fn cleanup(&self) -> Result<(), WorkspaceError>

Clean up the workspace directory (only for sandbox workspaces)

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for SessionWorkspace

fn clone(&self) -> SessionWorkspace

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl Debug for SessionWorkspace

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), Error>

Formats the value using the given formatter.